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KESAN MEKANISME PENGAWASAN KE ATAS KUALITI KAWALAN 
DALAM DAN PERHUBUNGANNYA DENGAN PRETASI OPERASI FIRMA 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini meneliti perhubungan di antara penzahiran mandatori dan 
sukarela berkenaan kawalan dalaman, termasuk perhubungan di antara 
jawatankuasa audit dan fungsi audit dalaman ke atas mutu kawalan dalaman 
untuk syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia (BM). Kajian ini juga 
meneliti perhubungan di antara mutu kawalan dalaman ke atas prestasi 
operasi. Kajian menggunakan teori agensi sebagai teori asas yang 
menyatakan penzahiran kawalan dalaman sebagai alat yang digunakan oleh 
pemegang saham untuk mengawasi mutu kawalan dalaman yang direka oleh 
pihak pengurusan. Kajian menggunakan analisa kandungan untuk mengukur 
mutu kawalan dalaman. Soal selidik telah dihantar kepada 181 syarikat yang 
tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia dan kajian telah menerima maklumbalas dari 
141 syarikat. Maklumat dari soal selidik di guna untuk mengutip data 
berkenaan fungsi audit dalaman, dan maklumat dari laporan tahunan syarikat 
diguna untuk mengutip data berkenaan jawatankuasa audit dan prestasi 
operasi. Kajian mendapati perhubungan yang positif di antara penzahiran 
mandatori kawalan dalaman dengan penzahiran sukarela kawalan dalaman. 
Ini bermakna lebih tinggi pematuhan keperluan dengan penzahiran mandatori 
Bursa Malaysia, maka  lebih tinggi penzahiran sukarela. Di antara dua 
mekanisme pengawasan lembaga, kajian tersebut mendapati perhubungan 
penting di antara fungsi audit dalaman dan mutu kawalan dalaman tetapi 
tidak menemui perhubungan signifikan di antara jawatankuasa audit dengan 
mutu kawalan dalaman. Juga, kajian tidak mendapati perhubungan yang 
signifikan di antara mutu kawalan dalaman dengan prestasi operasi.  
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THE IMPACT OF OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS ON QUALITY INTERNAL 
CONTROL AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH FIRM OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the relationship between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures on internal control, as well as the relationships between 
audit committee and internal audit function on the quality of internal control of 
public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. The study also examined the 
relationship between the quality of internal control on operating performance. 
It used agency theory as the underpinning theory, which postulated internal 
control disclosure as a tool shareholders used to monitor the quality of 
internal control designed by management. The study employed content 
analysis for measuring the quality of internal control. Questionnaires were 
sent to 181 public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia and the study received 
responses from 141 companies. Questionnaires were used to collect the data 
on internal audit function and annual reports were used to collect the data on 
audit committee and operating performance. The study found a significant 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures on internal control. 
This meant complying with the mandatory disclosure of Bursa Malaysia leads 
to higher voluntary disclosures. Of the two board oversight mechanisms, the 
study found a significant relationship between internal audit function and the 
quality of internal control but did not find a significant relationship between 
audit committee and the quality of internal control. Also, the study did not find 
as well a significant relationship between the quality of internal control on 
operating performance.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
  
 This is the first of five chapters of the thesis. This chapter described the 
background, problem statement, objectives and questions, and significance of 
the study.  
 
1.1 Background 
Recent reported cases of multibillion-dollar fraudulent corporate 
accounting and reporting scandals have refueled public policy debates on 
internal control. It is an issue of considerable interest to policy makers 
involved in corporate governance issues. A basic assumption of public policy 
debate on corporate governance is that internal control improves the quality of 
financial reporting and reduces governance problems. Internal control in 
essence is intertwined with and directly affected by the dynamics of corporate 
governance. Shareholders use internal control as a tool to protect their 
interests in the company. Internal control is intended to assure shareholders 
that significant weakness in the design or operation of internal control, which 
could adversely affect a company’s ability to meet its objectives, is prevented 
or detected early. Inseparable from the system of internal control are the 
oversight by audit committee and internal audit function. Yet, given the 
increasing attention on internal control, there was little empirical evidence on 
the effect of two internal control oversight mechanisms on the quality of 
internal control and the effect of the quality of internal control on operating 
performance.  
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1.1.1 Authoritative Publications on Internal Control 
 The development of legislations on internal control has been 
progressive. Diverse interest groups on internal control in the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) and the United States (U.S.) have, over the past decades, claimed that 
internal control improves financial reporting and is beneficial to capital 
providers and other stakeholders (Deumes, 2000).  
 In the U.K., the collapses of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) and the Maxwell Empire sparked widespread concern 
that led to the creation of the Cadbury Committee. The Cadbury Committee 
recommended listed companies to report on the effectiveness of internal 
financial control, while the Rutteman Committee provided guidance on how 
the board should review and report. Subsequent legislations issued after the 
Cadbury Committee such as the Hempel Committee, the Combined Code, as 
well as the Turnbull Committee have reiterated their recommendations in 
support of internal control. 
 In the U.S., successively over the last two decades starting with the 
Cohen Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treadway 
Commission, the U.S. Congressman Ron Wyden of the House Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee (Verschoor, 1991), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, the Public Oversight 
Board, and more recently the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have 
recommended the strengthening of internal control. Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, management and external (independent) auditors of public 
companies in the U.S. are required to report on the effectiveness of internal 
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control over financial reporting.  
 Likewise in Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia requires its public listed 
companies listed on its stock exchanges to report the state of internal control 
to shareholders. The requirements of internal control disclosures in Malaysia 
followed more closely the requirements of the Turnbull report in the U.K. 
rather than the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 404, 
and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Standard No. 
2 in the U.S. One fundamental difference between the Malaysian and U.S. 
internal control disclosure requirement is an internal control report in Malaysia 
is a written statement by the board of directors, whereas an internal control 
report in the U.S. is a written statement by management. This meant in 
Malaysia board of directors provide the assertions on internal control to 
shareholders whereas, in the U.S. management (rather than board of 
directors) provide the assertions on internal control to shareholders. 
 There are three other fundamental differences between the Malaysian 
and U.S. internal control requirements. First, the Malaysian boards do not 
have to opine on whether the internal control is effective but in the U.S. 
management (not boards) have to opine on the effectiveness of internal 
control but only as it relates to financial reporting. Second, the reporting 
period of the internal control report in the U.S. is at a point in time (e.g., at 
December 31, 2005) whereas, in Malaysia the report covers the entire 
reporting period from the commencement date to the approval date of the 
company’s financial statements. Third and lastly, external (independent) 
auditors in the U.S. are required to express two opinions on the company’s 
internal controls to shareholders: first, an opinion on management’s 
  4 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting; 
and second, an opinion on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial 
reporting. In Malaysia, external auditors do not have to opine on the 
effectiveness of internal control to shareholders and management do not have 
to assert on the effectiveness of internal control.  
Nevertheless, external auditors of public listed companies in Malaysia 
are required to provide a report to the board of directors (not to shareholders) 
on the board’s statement of internal control that is to be included in the annual 
report to shareholders. The report of the external auditors should contain a 
clear written expression of negative assurance. This meant that based on the 
review by the external auditors, in accordance with the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants Recommended Practice Guide 5, Guidance for Auditors on the 
Review of Directors’ Statement on Internal Control (RPG 5), nothing has 
come to the external auditors attention that causes them to believe that the 
board’s statement of internal control included in the annual report is 
inconsistent with their understanding of the process the board of directors has 
adopted in the review of the adequacy and integrity of internal control.  
The RPG 5 does not require external auditors to consider whether the 
board’s statement of internal control covers all risks and controls, or to form 
an opinion on the effectiveness of the risk and control procedures.  Also, the 
RPG 5 does not require external auditors to consider whether the processes 
described to deal with material internal control aspects of any significant 
problems disclosed in the annual report will, in fact, remedy the problems. 
Also, the report of the external auditors on the board’s statement of internal 
control was not intended to be a document to be included in the annual report, 
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it was provided only to the board of directors. Shareholders do not have ready 
access to the external auditors’ report on the review of the board’s statement 
of internal control. 
 
1.1.2 Internal Control Oversight 
 A discussion on internal control oversight would need to be preceded 
by a definition of internal control. Bursa Malaysia, through the Statement on 
Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Public Listed Companies, defines 
internal control as “…a process, effected by a company’s board of directors 
and management, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of the company’s objectives.” It is intended to ensure 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (Treadway Commission, 
1987). Ideally, internal control is intended to reduce the risk of fraudulent 
transactions because internal control failure could lead to major fraudulent 
corporate accounting and reporting scandals, whose occurrences tend to be 
sporadic as least in Malaysia. 
 Internal control oversight is the activities and efforts performed at key 
levels of a company that are responsible for effective functioning of internal 
control throughout the company (Root, 1998). Invariably, the interested 
parties in internal control oversight include shareholders, board of directors 
and board committees, and internal auditors. Shareholders are its ultimate 
beneficiaries, but the role of shareholders is primarily passive as it is 
impractical for shareholders to be involved directly in internal control even 
though they have a clear interest. Shareholders are not in the same position 
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as board of directors who, as indicated by the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (Malaysian Code), bears the overall responsibility for maintaining 
internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and company’s assets. 
The board, by virtue of its oversight responsibility, is able to get a closer look 
at how management implements internal control in the company. Further, the 
board is also more likely to be knowledgeable on internal control concepts 
and authoritative literature on internal control than shareholders.  
 Under the Malaysian Code, the board can delegate its power and 
authority for monitoring internal control to an audit committee of the board. 
The board’s delegation makes its audit committee the highest level of 
authority on internal control. Thus, from an internal control standpoint, the role 
of the board involves delegation of its responsibility to an audit committee, 
oversight of the audit committee, and ultimately, acceptance of the risks 
inherent in such a role. Consequently, only an audit committee is involved in 
internal control as the role of the board while critical would not be extensive in 
the terms of process involvement. To discharge its delegated responsibility on 
internal control, the audit committee needs to understand management’s 
approach to internal control and be satisfied that the approach is appropriate 
for the company. The audit committee may seek whatever assistance it 
believes necessary on internal control from an internal audit function. 
 An internal audit function is defined by the International Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing as “…a department, division, 
team of consultants or other practitioner(s) that provides independent, 
objective assurance, and consulting services designed to add value and 
improve an organization’s operations.” The head of internal audit function is 
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typically an executive position within a company. An internal audit function 
can positively affect the migration of audit committee’s approach on internal 
control because it is expected to possess expertise on internal control. Its role 
becomes much more significant as boards and audit committees become 
more accustomed to relying on its work as an independent source of opinions 
and information on internal control. At the same time, to be an effective 
partner, an internal audit function requires audit committee to oversee its 
budget approval process and policies regarding hiring, evaluation, training, 
and termination of audit staff. Absent a symbiotic relationship between audit 
committee and internal audit function, internal control oversight might not be 
as effective. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
A shareholder in a public listed company, whether an individual 
investor or an investing company, has the option to quit by selling its shares in 
the company. According to Thillainathan (1999), “…for a shareholder to rely 
on the exit route to protect himself and recover his investment, the regulatory 
regime in Malaysia must ensure that all material information that shareholders 
need to make decisions are disclosed on a full and timely basis…” Such 
disclosure includes information on the quality of internal control. There is no 
known or published study on the quality of internal control of Malaysian public 
listed companies, except for a study by Fadzil, Haron and Jantan (2005) that 
examined internal control in Malaysia using the five COSO internal control 
components. Also, there is no published study on the extent by which public 
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listed companies comply with the mandated disclosures on internal control 
required by Bursa Malaysia. 
   
1.2.1 Internal Control Disclosures 
The Malaysian Code envisages public listed companies to maintain a 
system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and 
company’s assets. The mechanism a public listed company uses to inform 
shareholders on internal control is by reporting the state of internal control in 
compliance with the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia. Such reporting 
makes internal control disclosures to be the only monitoring tool available for 
shareholders to assess the state of internal control in a public listed company 
for shareholders to be assured on the continued safety and soundness of 
their investments in the company.  
Internal control disclosures typically include disclosures on risk 
management, internal control, external auditors, internal audit function, audit 
committee, and internal control opinion. As a consequence, it is no longer 
enough for public-traded companies to take a minimalist approach on internal 
control disclosures particularly since five years have passed since the 
introduction of internal control disclosures. This meant internal control 
disclosures on mundane statements describing internal procedures that lack 
context and relevance. Internal control disclosures that contain vague 
disclosures of unclear meaning or that contain sweeping, albeit, confusing 
statements and assurances on internal control leads one to wonder about the 
dubious utility of these reports. Omissions and errors of mandatory internal 
control disclosures could raise questions of disclosure adequacy and possible 
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allegations of lack of due care by boards. Thus, if internal control disclosures 
are to continue to be effective monitoring tool for shareholders, the 
disclosures should be reliable, informative, and useful to whom they are 
directed as well as comply with the mandated disclosures of the Listing 
Requirements of Bursa Malaysia (i.e., mandatory disclosures). Useful and 
informative internal control disclosures are more likely to result in a company 
with sound internal control than in a company with inadequate internal control 
(Root, 1998).  
 
1.2.2 Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function 
Audit committee and internal audit function were introduced in the 
Malaysian Code to address agency problems in public listed companies. 
Agency theory deals with the problem of an agent acting on behalf of the 
principal. With the delegation of authority to an agent, the agent may take 
actions that are not in the principal’s best interests (i.e., acts of self-interest on 
the part of the agent but are unknown to the principal). The goal of oversight 
mechanisms in an agency relationship is to constrain the agent from acting 
improperly and provide it with incentives to act appropriately. In a public listed 
company, agency theorists view the company (the firm) as a “nexus of 
contracts” between shareholders (principal) and management (agents for the 
principal). Management are contractually bound to work for shareholders’ best 
interests but if management know that they will not be monitored and 
potentially punished, management may exert less effort than possible 
(shirking) or take advantage of company’s resources for their own personal 
benefit (Hess and Impavido, 2003).  
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 The success of audit committee and internal audit function in their 
oversight roles is unclear. Audit committees and internal audit function do 
exist in some form in public listed companies. But, they may not be operating 
as soundly as intended by regulations. Lack of competency, lack of 
understanding, resistance to change, and entrenched thinking on internal 
control are among the reasons for this state in the initial years (Root, 1998). 
Typically after the initial years of struggling with the implementation of internal 
control, companies gain experience as well as competence to enable internal 
control to mature to higher levels. Similarly, over time, audit committee and 
internal audit function also gain more experience and competence in their 
roles. Five years have passed since Bursa Malaysia introduced internal 
control reporting to public listed companies listed on its exchanges. Boards 
can no longer argue that they acted diligently if they failed to design audit 
committee and internal audit function that perform adequately to all the 
specified duties required of their roles. Such roles include the duty to inquire 
into the adequacy of the company’s internal control, both in theory and in 
practice, and to take actions to minimize the possibility that internal control 
can be overridden by management, thereby resulting in undetected fraud.  
 Much of the prior studies on internal control have focused on the 
characteristics of audit committees and internal audit function in isolation of 
the other, and often not on their effects on internal control and operating 
performance. The motivation for these prior research was due to new 
legislations on internal control and corporate governance released over the 
years by interest groups on internal control, such as security regulators, 
accounting and auditing professions, academia, and independent 
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commissions.  
 These studies tend to focus on the role and relevance of audit 
committees and internal audit function. For example, prior studies on audit 
committees tend to concentrate on issues related to the formation, 
composition, roles, and benefits of audit committees; and prior studies on 
internal audit function tend to concentrate on the demand for internal audit or 
examine it narrowly from the internal-external audit relationship for financial 
statement audit. These studies on audit committee and internal audit function 
have pointed to the relevance of a cohesive, well orchestrated, cooperative 
linkage between audit committees and internal audit function but few attempts 
were made to assess their influence on internal control and operating 
performance.  
 Therefore, this study investigates the quality of internal control and its 
relationships with two key oversight mechanisms and operating performance. 
The newness of the rejuvenated roles of audit committees and internal audit 
function on internal control could explain the lack of research on these two 
oversight mechanisms on the quality of internal control.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 Despite growing support on internal control, published research in this 
area has been descriptive (O’Reilly-Allen, 1997). Except for the recent flux of 
studies on internal control post Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in particular on 
the U.S. descriptive approach on implementing the Section 404 internal 
control requirements, there is no published study on the implementation of the 
Malaysian “the comply or explain” approach of implementing internal control 
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by public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. Further, while various interest 
groups on internal control have prescribed and stressed the importance of 
audit committee and internal audit function as oversight mechanisms on 
internal control, their significance on internal control is also largely unknown.  
 The objectives of this study were:  
• To examine the implementation of internal control disclosure in terms 
of its relationships between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
• To determine the relationship between the key characteristics of audit 
committee on the quality of internal control. 
• To determine the relationship between the key characteristics of 
internal audit function on the quality of internal control. 
• To determine the relationship between quality of internal control on 
operating performance.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 On the basis of the research background, this study was guided by five 
research questions: 
1. What is the association between mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
of internal control information to shareholders?  
2. Can quality of internal control be conceptualized and subsequently be 
measured by using disclosure of internal control practices?  
3. What are the pertinent characteristics of audit committee and their 
relationships with the quality of internal control?  
4. What are the pertinent characteristics of internal audit function and 
their relationships with the quality of internal control? 
  13 
5. What is the association between quality of internal control and 
operating performance? 
 The study carried out five steps to answer the research questions and 
examine the research objectives. First, it undertook a literature-based 
research to establish the criteria for assessing the quality of internal control 
using internal control disclosures. Second, it identified through literature 
review the pertinent characteristics of effective audit committee and internal 
audit function. Third, it tested empirically; through hypotheses testing, the 
effects of pertinent characteristics of audit committee and internal audit 
function on the quality of internal control. Fourth, it considered other external 
factors that might have an impact on the quality of internal control such as 
whether the company’s is a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors 
Malaysia or use external auditors from major auditing firms. Fifth and lastly, it 
used financial profitability ratios as proxies of operating performance to 
examine the relationship of operating performance to the quality of internal 
control. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 Cynicism still looms among shareholders on the value proposition of 
audit committee and internal audit function, the two oversight mechanisms of 
internal control, against corporate failures. The cynicism precipitates largely 
from the perception that companies establish audit committees and internal 
audit function merely to comply with stock exchange listing rules rather than 
their intended value to shareholders against corporate failures. Failure to 
address this perception early might lead to the belief that audit committee and 
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internal audit function exist for their form rather than substance and adds little 
or no value to internal control and company performance. A strong regulatory 
regime needs to be assured that the presence of audit committee and internal 
audit function, although motivated initially by regulations, are operating to 
protect shareholders' interests.  
 This study proposed changes to strengthen existing regulations on 
internal control and help reduce or validate skepticism on the value 
proposition of audit committee and internal audit function. The study also 
identified significant characteristics of audit committee and internal audit 
function, and provided a disclosure checklist for comprehensive voluntary 
internal control disclosures.  
 Further, this study ascertained whether there was a significant 
relationship between the quality of internal control and company performance. 
Also, this study extend the literature on internal control by providing further 
insights on the effects of two oversight mechanisms of internal control on the 
quality of internal control as well as the impact of operating performance on 
the quality of internal control in a “comply or explain” approach regulatory 
environment. Also, by determining the oversight mechanisms of internal 
control that impacts the quality of internal control, the results of the study will 
enable benchmarking by countries that are at the early, transition, or 
advanced stages of implementing the internal control disclosures as a 
monitoring tool to protect shareholders’ interests in a “comply or explain” 
approach regulatory environment. 
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1.6 Organization of the Remaining Four Chapters 
 Chapter 2 contained the literature review of the study. It introduced the 
theoretical research framework, and elaborated on the underpinning theory, 
the hypotheses tested, as well as the variables examined within the research 
framework. 
Chapter 3 contained the research methodology of the study. It 
described the research design that included data source and justification, unit 
of analysis, population and sample size, measurement of key variables, 
construction of the mail questionnaire, response rate, and effects of 
nonresponse bias. 
Chapter 4 discussed the results of the study. It provided a profile of 
respondent companies, descriptive statistics of the original data including a 
sector analysis of the final sample, and results of the hypotheses tested. 
Chapter 5 presented the discussion and conclusion of the study. It 
consisted of a recapitulation of the study, discussion of the results, 
consistency or otherwise of the results with prior research, implications and 
limitations, suggestions for future research, and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In Chapter 1, reference was made to the need for examining the 
effects of two oversight mechanisms of internal control on the quality of 
internal control as well as the impact of operating performance on the quality 
of internal control. This chapter introduced the theoretical research 
framework, and elaborated on the underpinning theory and assumptions, the 
hypotheses tested, as well as the variables examined within the research 
framework.  
 
2.1 Internal Control 
 As stated in Chapter 1, public policy debates on internal control are 
premised on the assumption that it improves the quality of financial reporting 
and reduces governance problems. However, internal control is not directly 
observable by shareholders because it comprises a set of activities within a 
company. Shareholders may have little or no incentive to monitor actively 
internal control and are unlikely to be fully informed about the extent or quality 
of internal control (Deumes & Knechel, 2005). If shareholders perceive that 
information is credible and relevant, internal control disclosures can serve as 
a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the agency problem in public listed 
company.  
 Prior studies on internal control have supported the relevance of 
internal control disclosures as a monitoring tool on internal control for 
shareholders and have focused on two dimensions: examining the substance 
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and variety of voluntary internal control disclosures in annual reports; and 
determining the usefulness of internal control disclosures to users of financial 
statements (El-Gazzar & Fornaro, 2003; O’Reilly-Allen & McMullen, 2002; 
Hermanson, 2000). For example, Deumes and Knechel, 2005; Willis and 
Lightle (2000) and El-Gazzar & Fornaro (2003) analyzed the different types of 
assertions contained in internal control disclosures; and Wallace (1981) 
analyzed the content of internal control disclosures of municipal government 
reports. Hermanson (2000) analyzed the demand for internal control 
disclosures by surveying disparate user groups. He found that internal control 
disclosures might serve to motivate both management and audit committee to 
focus their attention on enhancing internal control. Wallace and White (1996) 
found that senior management at companies with internal audit function 
focused primarily on aspects of financial controls (versus operational controls) 
and those at larger firms were more likely to publish internal control 
disclosures.  
 McMullen, Raghunandan and Rama (1996) found that although smaller 
firms had a higher incidence of financial reporting problems than larger firms, 
the incidence was lower when senior management at such companies 
published internal control reports. McMullen et al. (1996) offered two reasons 
why internal control disclosure can enhance internal control. First, it can 
increase the internal control awareness of management, which in turn lead to 
greater attention being paid by management to internal control. Second, it can 
lead to better internal control because it helps to communicate the tone at the 
top by sending a clear message within the company about the expected 
control environment. The tone at the top meant the corporate control 
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environment, which the Treadway Commission (1987) claimed to be an 
important factor contributing to effective internal control.  
 
2.1.1 Internal Control Disclosures 
Proponents of internal control disclosures, such as the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, believe internal control disclosures strengthen a 
company’s internal control. The increasing number of cases that deceitful 
management manipulated financial reporting has revitalized, once again, the 
value of internal control disclosures as a monitoring tool to protect 
shareholders’ interests. Internal control disclosures can be designed to 
provide information on internal control that is useful and valuable to 
shareholders. Shareholders need to know about the adequacy of a 
company’s internal control to help them evaluate the continued safety and 
soundness of their investments in the company. Root (1998) pointed out that 
useful and informative internal control disclosures are more likely to result in a 
company with sound internal control than in a company with inadequate 
internal control. 
 Internal control disclosure is risky but the risk varies inversely with the 
level of internal control attained (Root, 1998). For a company that has 
attained high level of internal control, such disclosure is an opportunity to 
showcase that quality. This can contribute to differentiating the company from 
its peers as an investment of choice for its shareholders as well as 
prospective shareholders. For companies that are not so advantaged such 
disclosures by others can help to motivate efforts to improve internal control 
  19 
to more competitive levels. In that, it could provide an impetus towards 
greater levels of excellence, which is a desirable outcome for the companies 
affected and their shareholders. This perspective is consistent with the basic 
assumption that a company that chooses to disclose extensively on internal 
control is hypothesized to be seeking a higher level of internal control for the 
welfare of its shareholders.  It is prudent then, to infer that a company with 
extensive internal control disclosures is assumed to have a higher quality of 
internal control than a company with less extensive internal control 
disclosures. 
 Internal control disclosures contained in annual reports is a suitable 
surrogate (proxy) on the quality of internal control when direct measures are 
unavailable. Recent studies examining internal control from the perspectives 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have used internal control disclosures published 
by public companies as proxy for quality of internal control (Bedad, 2006; 
Ogneva, Subramanyam & Raghunandan, 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & 
Kinney, 2006; and Ge & McVay, 2005). The usage of disclosures as a 
measure on the quality of internal control of public listed companies is 
premised on two assumptions. First, public listed companies have the 
resources to develop and implement comprehensive internal control that 
provide shareholders with assurances on the validity of the internal operating 
processes and accuracy of financial reports. Second, public listed companies 
use disclosures as a monitoring tool to gain shareholders’ confidence on their 
responsibilities on internal control.  
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2.1.2 Malaysian Internal Control Disclosure Requirements 
 
 In Malaysia, it was not until 2001 that Bursa Malaysia requires public 
listed companies to report the state of internal control to their shareholders. 
Public listed companies are required to ensure disclosures on internal 
controls contain adequate information to enable an informed assessment on 
internal control. This meant that Bursa Malaysia places the onus on the board 
to ensure internal control disclosures provide meaningful, high-level 
information and do not give misleading impression. It requires the board to 
disclose in the internal control report if it failed to conduct a review of the 
company’s internal control, and also requires the company to comply with the 
Statement on Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Public Listed 
Companies (the SIC). The SIC is a document that provides guidance to 
directors on internal control disclosures. The requirement to comply with the 
SIC now limits the freedom that companies have on internal control 
disclosures. Internal control disclosures required by Bursa Malaysia to be 
contained in annual report can be categorized to two broad categories, a 
minimum disclosure category (paragraphs 40, 41, and 42 of the SIC) and a 
general disclosure category (paragraph 43 of the SIC). 
 
2.1.2.1 Minimum (Mandatory) Disclosure Category 
  Under the minimum disclosure category, paragraph 43 states that 
where a board cannot make one or more of the disclosures in paragraphs 40, 
41, and 42, it should state this fact and provide an explanation. The eight 
minimum disclosure items and their related paragraphs in the SIC are:  
• There is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluating, and managing the 
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significant risks faced by the company (paragraph 40). 
• The process has been in place for the year under review (paragraph 40). 
• The process is regularly reviewed by the board (paragraph 40).  
• The process accords with the internal control guidance in the Statement 
on Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Public Listed Companies 
(paragraph 40).  
• The process the board (where applicable, through its committees) has 
applied to review the adequacy and the integrity of the system of internal 
control (paragraph 41). 
• The process that the board has applied to deal with material internal 
control aspects of any significant problems disclosed in the annual report 
(paragraph 41).  
• The board acknowledges that it is responsible for the company’s system of 
internal control and for reviewing its adequacy and integrity (paragraph 
42). 
• The board explains that such a system of internal control is designed to 
manage rather than eliminate the risk of failure to achieve business 
objectives and can only provide reasonable and not absolute assurance 
against material misstatement or loss (paragraph 42). 
The eight minimum disclosure items promulgated by Bursa Malaysia for 
public listed companies listed on its stock exchanges are consistent with the 
disclosures proposed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) for public listed companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.  
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2.1.2.2 General (Voluntary) Disclosure Category 
 Under the general disclosure category, there is only one item. Para 43 
of the SIC states that the board may wish to provide any additional 
information in the annual report to assist understanding of the company’s risk 
management processes and system of internal control. This meant that 
general disclosures are disclosures in excess of the minimum disclosure 
items. The inclusion of a general disclosure category by Bursa Malaysia 
suggests that disclosures that go beyond the minimum disclosure items are a 
way of signaling to shareholders the company’s commitment of maintaining 
effective internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and 
company’s assets. By requiring a minimum disclosure category (i.e., 
mandatory disclosure) and a general disclosure category (i.e., voluntary 
disclosure), Bursa Malaysia has ingeniously provided an enlightened way for 
management to communicate to shareholders voluntarily how they are 
running the business. Voluntary disclosure provides an opportunity for 
management to reduce information asymmetry by disclosing more information 
on internal control to shareholders and at the same time deal with the concern 
in an agency relationship that managers are not acting for the interests of 
shareholders. No general disclosure category, other than the minimum 
disclosure category, was proposed by the ICAEW in its Internal Control 
Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code. 
 
2.2 Oversight Mechanisms on Internal Control 
As stated in Chapter 1, the key oversight mechanisms on internal 
control in a public listed company are audit committee and internal audit 
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function. This study examined both oversight mechanisms on internal control 
as no one single oversight mechanism could be a panacea for addressing the 
misalignment of interests between managers and shareholders in an agency 
relationship. It was Ho (2003) who argues that no one single mechanism is a 
governance panacea and suggests that it is desirable to have a system of 
overlapping checks and balances. 
 
2.3 Audit Committee 
This section discussed the role of audit committee on the quality of 
internal control. The genesis of audit committee suggests that its inclusion in 
internal control oversight was part of the reaction to corporate abuses. 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) noted that instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting, defalcations, accounting method choice abuses, and opinion 
shopping served as evidence that management was not effectively 
accountable to the board. The audit committee was an attempt to specifically 
designate responsibility for internal control, to provide a reporting structure for 
insiders that would circumvent managerial retribution, and to supervise 
relations with the external auditor and internal auditors. In fact, the Malaysian 
Code unambiguously states that the board is ultimately responsible for 
internal control. But the Malaysian Code recognizes that the board will 
normally delegate to management the task of establishing and maintaining 
internal control. The delegation by the board does not end its responsibility on 
internal control to shareholders. The board is required to review the adequacy 
and integrity of internal control after due and careful enquiry of the information 
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and assurances provided to it by management. In reality, the board is more 
likely to delegate the review to its audit committee.  
An audit committee is defined as a board committee comprising of 
directors of the company who are appointed by the board to the audit 
committee. The board delegation makes its audit committee the single focal 
point on internal control. The board delegation also makes the audit 
committee a guardian to the board (as well as shareholders) on internal 
control. By analogy, an audit committee plays a critical role on internal control. 
This meant that audit committee has to review the company’s internal control 
to ensure that management has made appropriate disclosures in the internal 
control report. In doing so, the board has to ensure that the composition of its 
audit committee members possesses the necessary skills, technical 
knowledge, objectivity, and understanding of the company to undertake the 
review. The study by Raghunandan, Rama and Read (2001) provided 
empirical support on the importance of audit committee composition. In the 
study, Raghunandan et al. (2001) affirmed that audit committees comprised 
solely of independent directors and with at least one member having an 
accounting or finance background are more likely to have longer meetings 
with the head of internal audit function; provide private access to the head of 
internal audit function; and review the proposals and results of the internal 
audit function. 
 
2.3.1 Characteristics of Effective Audit Committee 
Audit committee effectiveness has been examined in many ways 
(Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001; Lee, Mande & Ortman, 2004; Krishnan, 
